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Ability Tracking and Social Capital in China’s Rural Secondary School System 
 
 
Abstract 
The goal of this paper is describe and analyze the relationship between ability 
tracking and student social capital, in the context of poor students in developing countries. 
Drawing on the results from a longitudinal study among 1,436 poor students across 132 
schools in rural China, we find a significant lack of interpersonal trust and confidence in 
public institutions among poor rural young adults. We also find that there is a strong 
correlation between ability tracking during junior high school and levels of social capital. The 
disparities might serve to further widen the gap between the relatively privileged students 
who are staying in school and the less privileged students who are dropping out of school. 
This result suggests that making high school accessible to more students would improve 
social capital in the general population.  
 
Keywords: Ability Tracking, Social Capital, Interpersonal Trust, Confidence in Public 
Institutions, Rural Secondary Schooling  
 
 
  
3 
 
 
Ability Tracking and Social Capital in China’s Rural Secondary School System 
Ability tracking (also known as streaming or ability grouping) describes the practice 
under which students are sorted into different groups based on their prior academic 
achievement or socioeconomic class. Ability tracking is one of the most common practices in 
secondary schools in developing countries (Hanushek, 2006; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; 
Glewwe et al., 2013; Arteaga and Glewwe, 2014). 1  The impact of ability tracking on student 
outcomes is contentious in the education literature. Supporters of ability tracking suggest that 
tracking improves academic performance for all students, because course curriculum and 
teacher efforts can be better targeted to the differing ability levels of students (e.g. Duflo et 
al., 2011; Booij et al., 2015). Critics of ability tracking argue that these systems have negative 
impacts on slow-tracked students by reducing positive peer effects, reducing student self-
esteem, and inhibiting upward mobility for students of lower socioeconomic status (e.g. 
Hanushek, 2006).  
Many studies have analyzed the impact of ability tracking on student academic 
performance, with mixed results (Kulik and Kulik, 1982; Slavin, 1990; Hoffer, 1992; Epple 
et al., 2002; Figlio and Page, 2002; West and Wößmann, 2006; Duflo et al., 2011). In a meta-
analysis of 52 studies carried out in secondary schools in developed countries (primarily 
based on correlational studies), Kulik and Kulik (1982) conclude that the average effect of 
ability tracking on student test scores is rather small. In contrast, in a recent experimental 
study conducted in Kenya with 121 primary schools, Duflo et al., (2011) found that tracking 
students by their prior academic achievement raised scores of all students over 18 months, 
even those assigned to lower achieving tracks.  
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While the literature is unclear about the effect of tracking on academic achievement, 
there is evidence that ability tracking can have negative effects on important non-cognitive 
outcomes for slow-tracked students. For example, studies show that the most significant 
consequence of being placed in the slow track is an increased risk of dropping out of school 
(McPartland, 1993; Filmer, 2000; Brown and Park, 2002; Wang et al., 2015). Slow-tracked 
students have also been shown to have elevated levels of psychological stress, such as anxiety 
and depression (Kokko et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2015). Other work documents that student 
self-esteem and confidence are significantly correlated with their position in the tracking 
system (Oakes, 1985; Van Houtte et al., 2012). In response to some of these negative 
proximate outcomes, it has been shown that slow-tracked students in tracked systems often 
become more aggressive, more impulsive, and exhibit more antisocial behavior (Kokko and 
Pulkkinen, 2000; Kokko et al., 2006).  
We hypothesize that the same mechanisms that drive these negative non-cognitive 
outcomes for slow-tracked students may also impact the social capital held by students in 
different tracks. Social capital is generally understood as a set of social norms that promote 
collective action (Coleman, 1988; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Putman, 1993). Social 
capital has been shown to be an important contributor to a country’s development (Woolcock, 
1998). At a micro level, social capital reduces transaction costs (La Porta et al., 1997; Zack 
and Knack, 2001), improves contract enforcement and facilitates credit for individual 
investors (Knack and Keefer, 1995). At a macro level, social capital fosters social cohesion—
which may improve the efficiency of public administration (Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1999).  
It has been established that there is a positive relationship between educational 
attainment and social capital. Education passes on social capital in the form of social rules, 
trust and norms (Leigh, 2006; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007; Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2013). 
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For example, in developed countries such as the United States, Britain, and Australia, 
education promotes greater civic participation, larger and more diverse social networks, as 
well as higher levels of social trust (Hall, 1999; Baum et al., 2000; Halpern, 2005; Li et al., 
2005).  
What has not been examined, to our knowledge, is whether student social capital 
might also be influenced by the differential treatment students receive in schools that use 
ability tracking. Theorists have been arguing since the 1970s that the day-to-day experiences 
of students in tracked education systems could promote very different social attitudes and 
expectations across groups (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Oakes, 1982; Bernstein, 1997). 
Teachers in competitive education systems are more likely to direct positive attention toward 
better-performing students (Vickers, 1994; Fortin et al., 2006). By contrast, slow-tracked 
students are often assigned less effective or less motivated teachers (Talbert and Ennis, 
1990), are more likely to be ignored by their teachers (Hallinan, 1996; Kerckhoff and 
Glennie, 1999), are reprimanded more often or more harshly than fast-tracked students (Shi et 
al., 2015), and sometimes even encouraged to drop out of school by their teachers (Bowditch, 
1993). In cultures that place a high value on academic achievement, students who have been 
placed in the slow track may also receive less attention and less support at home from their 
parents or other caregivers (Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler, 1997; Kraft and Rogers, 2015).  
Understanding social capital as the collection of norms that students hold (including 
interpersonal trust and confidence in public institutions), it would seem that ability tracked 
school systems might have a differential impact on the social capital of students in fast and 
slow tracks. For example, if a student is placed in the slow track and subsequently routinely 
ignored, punished or chastised by their teachers and parents, they may begin to have lower 
levels of trust in others and confidence in the institutions that they are attending. By contrast, 
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if a student is placed in the fast track and given more attention and treated preferentially by 
their teachers and parents, they may hold more favorable values towards school, their peers, 
and even social institutions around them. In spite of the logic behind this relationship, to our 
knowledge, no study has rigorously analyzed how ability tracking could affect the social 
capital of students‒‒either fast-tracked or slow-tracked students.  
It is important to note that there are other effects at work in schools that may also 
influence student social capital. In particular, there is evidence that social capital can vary by 
the type of student that is being examined, particularly on the basis of their socioeconomic 
status (Narayan, 1997; Grootaert, 2001). Specifically, the research shows that students of 
lower socioeconomic status tend to also have lower levels of social capital. Because our 
research goal is to isolate the impact of ability tracking on social capital, we seek to reduce 
this complexity by focusing on a single socioeconomic group. Consequently, in the rest of 
this paper, we have chosen to look at the poorest students within tracked schools, as they may 
be most vulnerable to the negative effects of being put in the slow track due to less parental 
support and lower parental educational background (Wilson, 1996; Grootaert, 2001; Tilak, 
2001; Brown and Park, 2002; Tarabini, 2010). By limiting our sample to the poorest students, 
we can expect that differences in socioeconomic status across students will not bias our 
results.  
The overall goal of this paper is to begin to fill in the gaps that exist in our 
understanding of the relationship between ability tracking and social capital among poor 
students in developing countries. To meet this goal, we have four specific objectives. First, 
we measure the levels of social capital among poor students who recently finished attending 
(or dropped out of) junior high school in a sample of tracked schools. Second, we compare 
the levels of social capital between students that have been on the fast track in junior high 
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school and those that have been on the slow track. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
having students go through a tracking system and the nature of the social capital that is 
produced (or not) by the system.  
In this paper we seek to achieve our goals and objectives in the context of rural China. 
Studying the relationship between secondary schooling experience and social capital 
formation in rural China may provide a unique opportunity for several reasons. First, because 
70 percent of school-aged children in China are growing up in rural areas, investigating the 
social capital of rural students is important if we are to understand the characteristics of 
China’s future labor force (Khor et al., forthcoming). Second, ability tracking and high stakes 
matriculation exams have been prevalent in China’s secondary education system for many 
years. The rigidity of China’s fast-tracked educational system, as well as the high social value 
placed on academic achievement in Chinese culture, may be particularly likely to create 
different environments for fast-tracked and slow-tracked students (and the differences in the 
experiences that students in different tracks have might lead to different levels of social 
capital). Finally, in China’s rural areas, there are still many poor families, which facilitates 
the selection of a cohort of students that are poor (which allows us to focus on the effect of 
fast-tracking on social capital without confounding the analysis with issues of differences in 
social capital by the differences in the socio-economic status of students). 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the practice 
of ability tracking in China’s junior high schools. In section 3 we explain the research design 
and data collection. In section 4 we explain the estimation strategy. In section 5 we present 
the results and in section 6 we conclude.  
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Ability Tracking in China’s Rural Junior High Schools  
Ability tracking has long been the norm in junior high schools in China (Cheung et 
al., 2003; Ding and Lehrer, 2007; Lai, 2007; Wang, 2008).  However, in recent years, 
international opinion has turned against ability tracking for the youngest age groups (Fiedler 
et al., 2002). Similar sentiments also emerged in China. In 2006, to fight the perceived 
negative effects of tracking on younger children, China’s central government explicitly 
prohibited junior high schools and primary schools from tracking students according to their 
ability (MOE, 2006). According to policy, formal tracking is only allowed at the level of high 
school or above.  
In spite of the policy, the incentives faced by principals and teachers in junior high 
schools strongly encourage ability tracking. At the end of junior high, admission to high 
school is determined almost exclusively by student performance on a single high stakes test. 
The odds of success are low. In poor rural counties, less than half of junior high graduates are 
able to gain admission to high school (Mo et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015). 
Because of the importance of a high school (and college) education in Chinese society today, 
only students who are successful on this exam have any chance of charting a course towards 
greater opportunity and social status that a college education offers (Wang et al., 2013; Ye, 
2013; Loyalka et al., 2014).  
As a result of this institutional reality, the primary incentive for principals and 
teachers is to focus their energies disproportionately on the best students. Studies have shown 
that reputations and prospects for officials, principals and teachers in China are almost 
exclusively determined by their ability to cultivate high achieving students who are most 
likely to gain admission into prestigious high schools and universities (Tsang, 2000; Shi et 
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al., 2015). Studies have shown that teachers in Chinese schools spend more time with 
(Stevenson et al., 1994; Xue and Ding, 2009); provide more tutoring for (Lei, 2005; Dang 
and Rogers, 2008; Tsang et al., 2010; Zhang, 2013); give greater encouragement to (Lee et 
al., 2009; Wang et al., 2015) and generally provide a more supportive environment to (Tang, 
1991; Shi et al., 2015) high achieving students relative to their peers.  
Low-performing students, by contrast, receive less attention. These students are often 
taught by less experienced teachers (Wang et al., 2015) and are given almost no 
encouragement from teachers or school administrators (Yi, 2011; Wang et al., 2012). In rural 
schools where teaching styles are especially strict, qualitative research reveals that harsh 
physical punishment is commonplace for low-performing students (Shi et al., 2015). In the 
most extreme cases, slow-tracked students are actively encouraged to drop out of school by 
their teachers, so as to improve the school’s or teacher’s testing statistics (Liu, 2014; Xue, 
2015). Low-achieving students drop out of school at high rates (Wang et al., 2015; Shi et al., 
2015) and have lower self-confidence and self-esteem (Cheng, 1997; Wong and Watkins, 
2001). Indeed, researchers have documented that this sort of “informal tracking” is pervasive 
in junior high schools across China (Yuen-Yee and Watkins, 1994; Yu and Suen, 2005; Liu 
and Wu, 2006; Dello-Lacovo, 2009).  
Faced with this system, how do teachers decide which students deserve their time and 
effort? In other words, how do teachers decide student track placement in this informal 
tracking system? First, and most obviously, student track placement is determined by prior 
academic achievement (Oakes, 1985; Slavin, 1993; Betts and Shkolnik, 2000). In Chinese 
junior high schools, students are generally asked to take an exam (usually mathematics) at the 
beginning of school to determine their prior academic ability for the purpose of tracking 
placement (Xinhua, 2010). Student motivation also matters‒‒students who are more 
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motivated to go to high school are more likely to get placed in the fast track (Yi et al., 2014). 
Students with higher socioeconomic status are also more likely to be fast-tracked, both due to 
the association between socioeconomic status and academic achievement, and due to the fact 
that social biases lead teachers and principals to expect students with wealthier and better 
educated parents to do better in the long run (Dang and Rogers, 2008; Tsang et al., 2010).  
Due to this competitive environment, we believe that ability tracking may be 
important in producing variable levels of social capital (especially social trust) among poor 
students in different tracks in junior high schools in rural China. At the very age when 
students are beginning to discover their beliefs (as separate from their parents) and starting to 
understand society around them (Chen et al., 2005), fast-tracked education in China places 
students into two very different environments. Fast-tracked students are in an environment 
that is encouraging and that involves a lot of positive interaction with authority figures; slow-
tracked students are in an environment that may be characterized by verbal abuse, physical 
violence, apathy, and negative and contentious relationships between adults and children.  
Research Design 
Sampling and Data Collection  
To understand how student tracking affects the social capital of students, we gathered 
data from 132 rural, public junior high schools in 15 nationally designated poor counties in 
Shaanxi province and Hebei province. Shaanxi is located in northwest China and has a GDP 
per capita of 27,133 yuan (4000 USD), while Hebei is located in central China with a GDP 
per capita of 28,668 yuan (4320 USD; China Statistical Yearbook, 2011). We chose these 
two provinces because they differ in terms of location and geography, allowing us to increase 
the generalizability of our findings.  
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We used official records to create a sampling frame of all rural, public junior high 
schools in the 15 nationally designated poor counties in Shaanxi and Hebei provinces at the 
start of the program. A total of 150 rural junior high schools were identified. We then 
excluded 18 schools in Hebei because the administrative records reported that the number of 
seventh grade students in these schools was fewer than 50 (and the schools were likely to be 
merged with some other school in the near future). Our final sample therefore included a total 
of 473 sample classes in 132 schools (71 in Shaanxi and 61 in Hebei). This sample is roughly 
representative of rural, public junior high schools in nationally designated poor counties in 
provinces like Shaanxi and Hebei.  
We also measured student’s academic performance, and their individual and family 
characteristics. Specifically, we first conducted a 30-minute standardized math test for all 
students using items from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS). 2 Then, we administered a questionnaire to all students to understand student 
individual and family characteristics, such as their gender, age, and parent education and 
migration status. Previous studies have used similar variables to explain student-level 
differences in educational outcomes (Currie and Thomas, 2000; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 
2002; Yi et al., 2012) and differences in social capital (Bowlby, 1988; Sampson and Laub, 
1995; Hall, 1999). A description of all control variables used is provided in Appendix A.  
As mentioned above, to control for the potential bias due to socioeconomic status 
effects on student social capital, we further restrict our sample to the poorest students. We 
adopted the following protocol to select the poorest students to form our analytical sample. 
We conducted the first round survey of all the seventh grade students and their homeroom 
teachers in our full sample at the beginning of the school year (in early October 2010). 
Students were asked to complete a checklist of major household assets. The homeroom 
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teacher of each class also filled out a questionnaire. One of the most important parts of the 
homeroom teacher’s form was a list of the poorest five students in his or her class based on 
his or her understanding. Following the first round survey, we identified the four poorest 
students in each classroom in two steps. First, a monetary value was attached to each 
surveyed household asset to produce a single ranking of family asset value in each class.  
Second, we used the list of poorest students in each class collected from homeroom teachers 
at the baseline survey. By matching these two pieces of information together, we identified 
the four poorest students in each class. In total, we identified 1892 poor students.  
Given that academic performance is highly correlated with socioeconomic status, we 
checked to make sure that the poor student sample had a wide distribution of prior academic 
achievement, and therefore that it was realistic to assume the poor students were sorted into 
different ability-group tracks. Because we administered the baseline math test to all students 
in each sample class (rather than just the four poorest students in each class), we can examine 
the distribution in scores for our sample of poor students relative to the full sample of poor 
and non-poor students to rule out this possibility. Figure 1 shows that while the poor students 
did perform at a lower level than the full sample of poor and non-poor students, on average, 
in fact, the distribution of poor student scores is normal and of a similar shape to that of the 
full sample of students. We therefore conclude that the distribution of scores among our poor 
sample is wide enough to allow for a meaningful consideration of the impact of student 
tracking on social capital among this more limited sample.  
Follow-up Survey 
The second round survey, just including the poor students sample, was conducted in 
October 2013, shortly after the students had graduated from junior high school and at a time 
immediately after the high school students had enrolled into high school. The survey was 
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conducted in two steps. First, we tracked each student’s educational status. Specifically, we 
ascertained whether each student had: (a) enrolled into academic high school (henceforth 
“high school”); (b) left school before the end of junior high school, or (c) left the schooling 
system after graduating from junior high school.3  
We visited all the students who had matriculated into high school in person to confirm 
their status and administer the survey; for the students who were no longer in school, we 
solicited the help of their previous teachers and classmates to track the students over the 
phone or by visiting them at their current place of residence. We followed a strict tracking 
protocol: in the first wave of this follow-up survey, we found 81 percent of sample students 
(1528 sample students); due to financial constraints, we then designated 25 percent of the 
remaining 19 percent of students as our “must-follow” group (62 sample students). We 
visited all of these “must-follow” students in person. The “must follow” group of students is 
correspondingly weighted in our analysis to account for the attrited students. Further, within 
all tracked students there are 9 percent of students (154 sample students) who has missing 
values in some of the outcome variables.4 Thus, in total we have 1436 sample students to 
form the analytical sample.  
As shown in Figure 2, at the time of the second round survey (three years after the 
first round survey), about 50 percent of students had enrolled in high school. Of the 
remaining students, 26 percent never graduated from junior high school and about 24 percent 
of students finished junior high but did not enroll in high school. In sum, half of the students 
(50 percent) did not continue their studies.5  
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In the second step we measured student social capital. The surveys were conducted in 
person, either through face-to-face interviews, or over the phone. A full description of our 
measures is in the subsection immediately below.  
Measuring Social Capital 
Studies argue that social capital manifests itself in individuals as a tight reciprocal 
relationship between levels of civic engagement, interpersonal trust, and other pro-social 
attitudes (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Putnam, 1993; Brehm and Rahn, 1997). In this 
study, we focus on two more narrowly defined attitudes that are important to broader social 
capital: interpersonal trust and confidence in public institutions. All outcome variables were 
based on questions taken directly from the General Social Survey (GSS) and World Value 
Survey (WVS). These measures have been implemented across more than 40 countries since 
the 1980s.  
To measure student interpersonal trust, the question was: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with 
other people?” To measure confidence in public institutions, we asked students to answer the 
following question: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the 
people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of 
confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” The question 
was asked four times for each of the following institutions: educational institutions, the 
media, banks and financial institutions, and the government. Detailed description of all the 
outcome variables can be found in Table 1, and the detailed distribution of the outcome 
variables can be found in Appendix A. 
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Estimation Strategy 
Student Track Placement 
To examine the relationship between ability tracking and student social capital, we 
must first identify student track placement. As we explained above, although ability tracking 
is pervasive in China’s junior high schools, it is technically/legally prohibited. Because of 
this, it is impossible for researchers to systematically collect explicit information about 
student track placement from students or teachers directly. The words “fast track” and “slow 
track” are never used inside schools. As a consequence, school principals and teachers are 
often not willing to respond to questions about it‒‒in either formal interviews or in written 
surveys. They will almost all admit, confidentially, that there is still fast tracking inside 
classes in their school, but they will not do so on-record.  
Because of this, we need to use an indirect way to classify students as those placed on 
the fast track or the slow track. To identify whether students were fast-tracked or slow-
tracked during junior high school, we adopt an approach in which we seek to mimic the way 
teachers would identify students (early in their junior high careers) and either put them on the 
fast or slow track. As mentioned above, international evidence (as well as studies in China) 
has shown that teachers in tracked schooling systems relegate students to either the fast or 
slow track based on a set of pre-existing criteria. These criteria include student test scores, 
but also often include a set of less tangible characteristics (such as student motivation and the 
educational and occupational backgrounds of their parents) that are associated with a high 
probability that the student will be able to do well enough academically to make it into high 
school. In our analysis, we attempt to mimic this process using student and parent 
characteristics (including scores made on a standardized math test) collected at the baseline 
survey in the first year of junior high school.  
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Statistically what we do is to take information from the baseline survey (when the 
students were in grade 7 in junior high school) and see which of those variables helps us 
predict who ultimately (three years later) will matriculate to high school (since we also 
collected this information about eventual student outcomes). To do so, we first use a Probit 
regression model to explain the observed relationship between baseline student characteristics 
and the educational outcome of students (i.e., did a student test into high school):   
𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝛷(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗)    (1) 
where Mij represents student i at school j’s educational status after the end of junior high 
school (at the time of our second round survey). In our analysis, Mij is equal to one if a 
student matriculated into high school, and Mij is equal to zero if a student did not continue on 
in high school. In equation (1), Sij, Pij and Hij are vectors of baseline student, parent and 
family background characteristics. The full list of control variables is presented in Appendix 
A. 𝜃𝑗  is school fixed effects and εi is the regression error term.  
Once we have estimates of the relationship between educational performance (test 
scores) and characteristics of the students that the teachers observe, the next step is to predict 
which student (based on those characteristics) would be placed in the fast track and which 
student would be in the slow track. To take this next step, we proceed by using the 
coefficients from equation (1), 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, and θj, to produce the predictions. We carry 
out this step by using the actual observed values for each student and creating a prediction 
(also for each student), or ?̂?𝑖𝑗. The student-specific ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is generated from the following 
formula: 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑗 = 𝛷(?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑆𝑖𝑗 + ?̂?2𝑃𝑖𝑗 + ?̂?3𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗)   (2) 
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?̂?𝑖𝑗is an estimated probability that the student is assigned to the fast track. It is important to 
note that in this formulation ?̂?𝑖𝑗 ranges from zero to one. 
This analysis has developed a reasonable prediction of ultimate schooling outcome for 
each student. However, the variable that has been generated is continuous. In order to 
proceed with the analysis, we need to choose a cutoff point (ρ) that will allow us to divide the 
students into one of two categories: those who are most likely to continue on to high school 
(fast track) and those who are least likely to continue on to high school (slow track). To do 
so, we use the conventional method proposed in Wooldridge (2010). Conceptually, in this 
method we maximize the percent correctly predicted. According to this approach, if ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is 
larger than a set probability threshold, where we get the maximum percent correctly 
predicted, then the student is assigned to the fast track (Ti =1). If not, then the student is 
assigned to the slow track (Ti= 0).  
 After choosing this approach, the next step is to count the false predictions where 
student is assigned to the fast (or slow) track but do not (or do) matriculate into high school 
over each probability threshold. Then we calculate the false-prediction rate (number of false-
predicted students divided by all sample students) over each probability threshold, and plot 
out the decision curve. The cutoff (ρ) we will choose is the probability threshold where we 
get the lowest false-prediction rate (or the maximum percent correctly predicted).  
We present the Probit regression results in Table 2. In running this regression, we find 
that at the probability value 0.55 (ρ=0.55) we get the lowest false-prediction rate (21 percent, 
Figure 3). This means that using our model predicted correctly 79 percent of the time from a 
student’s baseline characteristics whether that student would be successful in matriculating to 
high school. Thus, in the end we determined that 788 students in our sample were fast-
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tracked (Table 3, Row 1, Column 3) and 648 students were slow-tracked (Table 3, Row 2, 
Column 3).  
Of course, because our rate of prediction was not perfect, we did find that among the 
788 students that we predicted as fast-tracked students, 173 of them ultimately did not 
matriculate into high school. In the rest of the paper we call these the underachievers: they 
were fast-tracked during junior high school, but failed to live up to their potential by not 
gaining admission to high school. In addition, among the 648 slow-tracked students, there 
were 137 students who did end up matriculating into high school in spite of their less 
impressive baseline characteristics. In the rest of the paper, we call these the overachievers: 
they exceeded their baseline potential by gaining admission to high school against the odds. 
In the final section of the paper, we will look at these students in particular to see if their 
defiance of original expectations resulted in different levels of social capital from the students 
who fit more neatly into the categories they were placed in at the start of junior high school.  
Tracking and Student Social Capital  
Once we were able to assign each student to the fast- or slow-track, we then analyze 
how student tracking placement during junior high school is correlated with student social 
capital at the end of junior high school. To do so, we conduct OLS regression analysis to 
assess the correlation between a student’s assigned track (fast- or slow-) and his/her social 
capital. The basic model that helps explain social capital is:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑗
′ + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗       (3) 
In equation (3), Yij is the outcome variables that we are interested in. Tij is the dummy 
treatment variable, which takes the value of one if student was from the predicted fast track 
(?̂?𝑖𝑗≥0.55), or zero if they were from the predicted slow-tracked (?̂?𝑖𝑗˂0.55). Xij’ is a vector 
of student, parent and family characteristics to form the controls, which is the same as in 
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equation (1). We also controlled school fixed effects (𝜃𝑗) and clustered standard errors at the 
school level.  
Results 
Social Capital among Rural Young Adults in China 
We first describe the social capital of poor rural junior high school students in China—
without separating students by fast- and slow-track. According to our analysis, we find that 
there is a significant lack of interpersonal trust among poor rural junior high school students 
in China. About half of the sample students reported that most people cannot be trusted (49 
percent, Table 4, Row 1, Column 1).  
Second, when we look at the confidence of students in public institutions, the results 
are even worse. In general over two thirds of students distrust public institutions (Table 4, 
Row 2 to 5, Column 1). Specifically, we find only 36 percent of students report that they are 
confident in educational institutions. More than 60 percent of our sample students distrust 
schools.  Only 19 percent of students report that they trust the media (Table 4, Row 3, 
Column 1). The confidence of students in banks and financial institutions and in the 
government are, unsurprisingly, similarly low, respectively 40 percent and 38 percent for this 
sample of poor rural students (Table 4, Rows 4 to 5, Column 1). 
Tracking and Social Capital 
Descriptive analysis 
Our data also show that ability tracking is highly correlated with social capital. 
Specifically, the descriptive results show that fast-tracked students have a significantly higher 
level of interpersonal trust than their slow-tracked peers. For example, the interpersonal trust 
of fast-track students is 17 percentage points higher than their slow-tracked peers (Table 4, 
Row 1, Column 4). About 59 percent of fast-tracked students believe that “most people can 
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be trusted”, while only 42 percent of slow-tracked students believe the same (Table 4, Row 1, 
Columns 2 and 3).   
The gap in confidence in public institutions is even wider. We find that only 20 
percent of slow-tracked students trust educational institutions (Table 4, Row 2, Column 3). 
Fast-tracked students have almost three times (30 percentage points) higher probability than 
slow-tracked students of feeling confidence in educational institutions (Table 4, Row 2, 
Column 4).  
Similar results can also be found for student confidence in other public institutions. 
For example, descriptive analysis show that fast-tracked students are 11 percentage points 
higher than slow-tracked students in their confidence in the media (Table 4, Row 3, Column 
4), 17 percentage points higher than slow-tracked students in their confidence in banks and 
financial institutions (Table 4, Row 4, Column 4), and 22 percentage points higher in their 
confidence in the government (Table 4, Row 5, Column 4).  
Multivariate Analysis 
After we control for individual, parent and family characteristics, as well as school 
fixed effects, we find that the OLS regressions yield results that are consistent with our 
descriptive analysis. We find that fast-tracked students are still 15 percentage points higher 
than slow-tracked students in their interpersonal trust (Table 5, Row 1, Column 1). This result 
again provides evidence that ability tracking is positively associated with student social 
capital.   
The OLS results for student confidence in public institutions are consistent and 
robust. As we can see from Table 5, fast-tracked students are 15 percentage points higher in 
confidence in the schooling system than slow-tracked students (Row 1, Column 2); 7 
percentage points higher in confidence in the media (Row 1, Column 3); 13 percentage points 
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higher in confidence in banks and financial institutions (Row 1, Column 4); and 16 
percentage points higher in confidence in the government (Row 1, Column 5).  All of these 
results are significant at the 10 percent level or higher. 
Disappointment, Overachievement and Social Capital 
In the preceding section we examined the relationship between ability tracking 
placement (which was a decision that we are assuming is typically made early on in junior 
high school) and student social capital. However, there may be an additional effect to 
consider. In a competitive education system where schooling outcomes are primarily 
determined by a single high-stakes test, the impact of tracking may be tempered by 
unexpected results on that test. If a fast-tracked student fails to realize their goal of 
matriculating into high school, that might have a negative impact on their social capital. 6 
Conversely, there is also a bright side to this potential effect. It is also possible for a slow-
tracked student to unexpectedly make it into high school by doing well on the exam. If this is 
the case, this might have a positive impact on that social capital of student (which is 
measured after matriculating to high school).  
Robustness Analysis 
 In this subsection we are going to examine the robustness of the results in two ways. 
First, instead of comparing human capital by ability tracking, we simply divide the 
observations into those that went to high school and those that did not. We do this because it 
is possible that social capital may be affected by the mere fact of being able to matriculate to 
high school or not. In addition, matriculation to high school is much more observable than 
participation in the fast or slow track prior to the time that students are able to matriculate to 
high school or not. Second, we will continue to look at the impact of ability tracking on social 
capital, but, in the spirit of robustness analysis, we recognize that expectations of being in the 
22 
 
track (which we are assuming has a formulate effect on social capital) may not be always 
realize. Specifically, given a student’s participation in the fast (slow) track which is associate 
with the expectation of going to (not going to) high school, we will examine what happens to 
social capital when a student on the fast track does not get into high school as well as what 
happens to social capital when a student on the slow track does make it.  
Going to High School or Not:  
 According to our results when we split the sample into those that went to high school 
and those that did not, the results, in fact, are similar to the results in the ability tracking 
analysis (see Appendix B for the results). For example, we find that student who matriculated 
into high schools are 22 percentage points higher than student who did not matriculate into 
high schools in interpersonal trust (Appendix B, Row 1, Column 1). We also find the same 
results hold over student confidence in public institutions. Student who matriculated into high 
school had 34 percentage points higher confidence in educational institutions relative to their 
peers who did not matriculate into high school (Appendix B, Row 1, Column 2). Their 
confidence in the media is 13 percentage points higher, confidence in banks and financial 
institutions is 21 percentage points higher, and confidence in the government is 24 percentage 
points higher (Appendix B, Row 3 to 5, Column 3). Consistent results observed with OLS 
regression after we controlled student individual, parents, family characteristics and school 
fixed effects (Appendix B, Row 1 to 5, Column 4).  
Unrealized Expectations:  
An issue that has received attention in other countries that have ability tracking 
systems punctuated from time-to-time (e.g., between lower and upper secondary school) with 
high-stakes exams is the effect of realized or unrealized student expectations (Clarke et al., 
2000; Yu and Suen, 2005; Liu and Wu, 2006). If student tracking creates a certain amount of 
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positive (negative) social capital for high-performing (low-performing) students, what 
happens to that level of trust when a fast-tracked student fails to pass the high-stakes exam at 
the end of the program? What happens to the low levels of trust when a slower-tracked 
student somehow manages to pass the high-stakes exam against the odds? Is the trust (or lack 
of trust) that is fostered during a student’s experience in the tracked school system reversed 
or maintained? 
To examine this possibility, we examine the levels of social capital of two groups of 
students we introduced in the methodology section: the underachievers (fast tracked students 
who did not get in to high school) and the overachievers (slow tracked students who got into 
high school against the odds). In particular, we compare the levels of social capital of the 
disappointed students relative to their successful fast-tracked peers, and the overachievers 
relative to their slow-tracked peers who, as predicted, did not get in to high school. 
According to the results of our analysis, we find a significant positive effect on social 
capital among the overachievers. Slow-tracked students who did manage to get into high 
school have 21percentage points higher social trust relative to slow-tracked students who did 
not get into high school (Table 6, Row 1, Column 3). The same relationship holds for 
confidence in public institutions. Overachieving slow-tracked students had 27 percentage 
points higher confidence in educational institutions relative to their other slow-tracked peers 
(Table 6, Row 2, Column 3). Their confidence in the media is 9 percentage points higher, 
confidence in banks and financial institutions is 24 percentage points higher, and confidence 
in the government is 28 percentage points higher (Table 6, Row 3 to 5, Column 3). In fact, we 
find that the “overachievement” effect on social capital is actually larger than the “tracking” 
effect on social capital for some outcomes (Table 4, Column 4 vs. Table 6, Column 3), such 
as interpersonal trust (21–17=4 percentage points), confidence in banks and financial 
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institutions (24-17=7 percentage points), and confidence in the government (28-22 = 6 
percentage points).  
Disappointed hopes appear to have a negative effect on social capital of a similar 
magnitude. Fast-tracked students who failed to matriculate into high school (underachievers) 
showed significantly lower levels of interpersonal trust relative to their fast-tracked peers 
who did get in to high school (20 percentage points, Table 6, Row 1, Column 6). This 
negative relationship holds for confidence in public institutions. Underachievers showed 
significantly lower levels of confidence in educational institutions (37 percentage points, 
Table 6, Row 2, Column 6), lower confidence in the media (13 percentage points, Table 6, 
Row 3, Column 6), lower confidence in banks and financial institutions (27 percentage 
points, Table 6, Row 4, Column 6), and lower confidence in the government (21 percentage 
points, Table 6, Row 5, Column 6). The magnitude of these negative effects are even higher 
than the positive effects observed for overachieving slow-tracked students.  
We present the multivariate analysis in Appendix C. The adjusted model (with 
controls for individual, parents and family characteristics as well as school fixed effects) 
produces results of similar magnitudes that are statistically significant (Appendix C). All 
observed negative impacts for the underachievers are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Drawing on data from 1436 poor students in rural China, this study has investigated 
the current state of social capital among this group of youth in rural China and examined the 
relationship that exists between ability tracking and student social capital. In general (for all 
youth that we study), we find a significant lack of interpersonal trust among poor rural young 
adults. Confidence in public institutions is even lower among this population of students. 
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Such low levels of social capital among an important plurality of China’s future labor force, 
accompanied with growing economic inequality, may pose a significant challenge to 
maintaining an engaged cohort of individuals that can play a positive role in building a 
modern, socially stable society.  
So what is the mechanism of these low rates of social capital? While the results are 
admittedly only associations and not causal relationships, we do find that there is a strong 
correlation between student tracking during junior high school and social capital. Students 
who are fast-tracked while in school have significantly higher interpersonal trust and 
confidence in public institutions relative to students who are slow-tracked, even when 
student, parent and family characteristics are controlled for. This builds on existing research 
showing that ability tracking is closely associated with significant negative non-cognitive 
effects for slow-tracked students. These disparities might serve to further widen the gap 
between the relatively privileged students who are staying in school and the less privileged 
students who are dropping out of school.  
Finally, we find that expectations matter. Students whose baseline characteristics 
make them more likely to gain admission to high school experience a reduction in social 
capital when they are unsuccessful in that effort. Students whose baseline characteristics 
make them less likely to gain admission to high school experience a positive gain in social 
capital when they are unexpectedly able to get in to high school. This may suggest that 
making high school accessible to more students would have an even greater impact on 
improving social capital in the general population. 
Taking all of this evidence together, we argue that it is important to take social capital 
into account when estimating the returns of education and deciding on the optimal 
organization for education systems. This may be especially true in developing countries 
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where formal institutions are less well established. This result suggests that the classic trade-
off between equity and efficiency in arguments about tracking may be missing a large portion 
of the equation. Even if tracking promotes higher test scores among the elite students, if it 
undermines social capital for low-performing students it may still have significant long-term 
costs for society as a whole. Taking into account both human capital and social capital returns 
from secondary education would yield a more comprehensive picture for investment 
decisions in developing countries.  
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Notes: 
1 In our study, we define ability tracking according to one (of several different) common 
practice in developing countries, as the sorting of students within the same school into 
different classes according to their ability, and teaching the students in each track at 
corresponding levels of curricular difficulty. There are also systems that track students into 
separate fast-track schools and slow-track schools. In our sample areas, this is less common.  
2 We chose math test scores because they are one of the most common outcome variables 
used to proxy educational performance in the literature (Schultz, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; 
Glewwe and Kremer, 2006).  
3 We focus on academic high school (rather than vocational high school) to reflect the higher 
social value ascribed to academic high school in Chinese society. 
4 We used multiple imputation to deal with missing data and the results are consistent.  
5 Reentering the schooling system after dropping out is possible in China, but very 
uncommon.  
6 Failed to achieve their goal might due to various reasons. For example, student might not be 
able to pass the high-stakes exam as we have argued that this competitive exam system often 
frustrates students. Or students might due to financial reasons that could not matriculated into 
high schools since the cost of high schools in China is often prohibitive (Liu et al., 2009), and 
the opportunity cost are increasing fast (Yi et al., 2012).  
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Figures: 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of student TIMSS test score between poor sample students and full 
sample students 
 
Data source: Authors’ survey 
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Figure 2: The distribution of students after graduation  
  
  
50%
24% 26%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Matriculate into high school Leave schooling system after
junior high
Dropout before junior high
graduation
44 
 
Figure 3: Decision Curve for Selecting the Threshold Probability 
 
Data Source: Authors’ survey 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Description of Social Capital Variables  
Definitions Descriptions 
Interpersonal trust  
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
Dummy equal to 1if respondent says, “most people can be trusted”, and to 0 
if he or she says, “you cannot be too careful”.  
  
Confidence in public institutions 
I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as 
the people running these institutions are concerned, would you 
say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, 
or hardly any confidence at all in them? 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent 
says, “they have a great deal of 
confidence”, and to 0 if he or she 
says, “only some confidence” or 
“hardly any confidence”. 1 
Confidence in educational institutions 
Confidence in the media 
Confidence in banks and financial 
institutions 
Confidence in the government 
                                                 
1 We categorized “only some confidence” and “hardly any confidence” together as zero because there might be upward bias due to the affirmative answers (Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2000). A respondent may feel ‘good’ about himself if he/she answers affirmative answers, and this motivates us to categorize “only some 
confidence” as non-trusting. Same apply to confidence in the media, banks and financial institutions and government. 
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Table 2: The Determinants of Student Track Placement, probit regression 
 Students enrolled into high school 
program, 1=yes 
 (1) 
Student individual characteristics  
1. Student age, in years -0.41*** 
(0.05) 
2. Female student, 1=yes 0.28*** 
(0.09) 
3. Student plan to go to high school at the baseline 
survey, 1=yes 
0.31*** 
(0.09) 
4. Student normalized baseline TIMSS test score at the 
baseline survey 
0.39*** 
(0.05) 
Parent characteristics  
5. Mother’s education, in years 0.01 
(0.01) 
6. Father’s education, in years 0.03 
(0.02) 
7. Mother’s health, 1=health 0.02 
(0.10) 
8. Father’s health, 1=health 0.10 
(0.11) 
9. Mother has migrated before, 1=yes -0.05 
(0.10) 
10. Father has migrated before, 1=yes 0.03 
(0.11) 
Family characteristics  
11. Number of siblings 0.08 
(0.06) 
12. Family asset, in ten thousand yuan 0.03 
(0.03) 
School Fixed Effects Yes 
Constant 5.49*** 
(0.78) 
Observations 1,436 
McFadden’s R2 0.26 
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.33 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Predicted Student Track Placement 
 Get into high school,  
T=1 
Did not get into high 
school, T=0 
Total  
Estimated fast-tracked, Z=1 615 173 788 
Estimated Slow-tracked, Z=0 137 511 648 
Total 752 684 1436 
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Table 4: Differences in Social Capital Between Fast-tracked and Slow-tracked Students 
Outcome variables Overall Students Fast-tracked 
students 
Slow-tracked 
students 
Difference between fast- and 
slow-tracked students 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) = (2) - (3) 
1. Interpersonal trust, 1=most people can be 
trusted 
0.51 0.59 0.42 0.17*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
2. Confidence in education institutions, 1=yes 
0.36 0.50 0.20 0.30*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
3. Confidence in media, 1=yes 
0.19 0.25 0.13 0.11*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
4. Confidence in banks and financial 
institutions, 1=yes 
0.41 0.48 0.32 0.17*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
5. Confidence in government, 1=yes 
0.38 0.49 0.27 0.22*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
No. of observations 1436 788 648 1436 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in the parentheses; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1; 
Data source: Authors’ survey.  
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Table 5: The Correlation Between Student Track and Social Capital, OLS results. 
 Student interpersonal trust and confidence in public institutions 
Outcome variables Interpersonal 
trust 
Confidence in 
education 
institutions 
Confidence in the 
media 
Confidence in banks 
and financial 
institutions 
Confidence in the 
government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment variable  
1. Student were fast-tracked, 1=yes 0.15** 0.15*** 0.07* 0.13** 0.16*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
2. Student individual, parent and 
family characteristics  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3. School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.92*** 0.58** 0.20 0.12 0.81** 
(0.32) (0.26) (0.22) (0.30) (0.34) 
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 
R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.23 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
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Table 6: Overachievers and Underachievers: Comparison of Social Capital  
 Panel 1: Predicted slow-tracked students Panel 2: Predicted fast-tracked students 
Outcome variables Predicted slow-
tracked students 
matriculated 
into high school 
(Overachievers)a 
Predicted slow-
tracked students, 
who didn’t 
matriculate into 
high school 
Difference Predicted fast-
tracked students, 
who didn’t 
matriculate into 
high school 
(Underachievers)b 
Predicted fast-
tracked students, 
who 
matriculated into 
high school 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) (6) = (4) – (5) 
1. Interpersonal trust, 1=most 
people can be trusted 
0.61 0.39 0.21*** 0.41 0.64 -0.20*** 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
2. Confidence in education 
institutions, 1=yes 
0.45 0.17 0.27*** 0.19 0.56 -0.37*** 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
3. Confidence in media, 1=yes 
0.21 0.12 0.09* 0.15 0.27 -0.13*** 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
4. Confidence in banks and 
financial institutions, 1=yes 
0.51 0.28 0.24*** 0.26 0.53 -0.27*** 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
5. Confidence in government, 
1=yes 
0.50 0.23 0.28*** 0.28 0.53 -0.21*** 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
No. of observations 137 511 648 173 615 788 
Note:  
a) Panel 1 we compare the overachievers with predicted slow-tracked students who unexpectedly matriculated into high schools. 
b) Panel 2 we compare the underachievers with predicted fast-tracked students who unexpectedly did not matriculated into high schools.  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Data source: Authors’ survey.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Description of all the variables. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome Variables      
1. Interpersonal Trust, dummy variable, 1= yes 1436 0.51 0.50 0 1 
2. Confidence in educational institutions, 1=yes 1436 0.36 0.48 0 1 
3. Confidence in media, 1=yes 1436 0.19 0.39 0 1 
4. Confidence in banks and financial institutions, 1=yes 1436 0.41 0.49 0 1 
5. Confidence in government, 1=yes 1436 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Treatment variables       
6. Students were fast-tracked, 1=yes 1436 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Control Variables      
7.  Student age, in years 1436 13.51 1.03 10.83 18.62 
8.  Student gender, 1=female 1436 0.51 0.50 0 1 
9.  Normalized TIMSS test score at the baseline 1436 -0.06 1.01 -2.72 2.72 
10. Plan to go to high school after jr. school at the baseline 
survey, 1=yes 
1436 0.48 0.50 0 1 
11. Mother’s education, in years 1436 5.33 3.46 0 20 
12. Father’s education, in years 1436 7.07 2.89 0 19 
13. Mother’s health, 1=not health 1436 0.37 0.47 0 1 
14. Father’s Health, 1= not health 1436 0.46 0.49 0 1 
15. Mother had ever migrated, 1=yes 1436 0.48 0.49 0 1 
16. Father had ever migrated, 1=yes 1436 0.80 0.40 0 1 
17. Number of siblings 1436 1.02 0.82 0 5 
18. Family assets at the baseline, in 10 thousand yuan 1436 3.72 2.62 0 17.36 
Data source: author’s survey.  
  
 52 
Appendix B: Differences in Social Capital Between Student Who Matriculate into High School and Students Who do not 
Outcome variables Student who 
matriculated into 
high school 
Student who did 
not matriculate 
into high school 
Differences  Coefficient from OLS 
Regression  
 (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) 
1. Interpersonal trust, 1=most people can be 
trusted 
0.61 0.39 0.22*** 0.20*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
2. Confidence in education institutions, 1=yes 
0.52 0.18 0.34*** 0.26*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
3. Confidence in media, 1=yes 
0.25 0.12 0.13*** 0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
4. Confidence in banks and financial 
institutions, 1=yes 
0.50 0.29 0.21*** 0.18*** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
5. Confidence in government, 1=yes 
0.50 0.26 0.24*** 0.20*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
No. of observations 752 684 1,436 1,436 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in the parentheses; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1; 
Data source: Authors’ survey.  
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Appendix C: The Effect of Realized (or Unrealized) Expectations on Student Social Capital, OLS  
 Student interpersonal trust and their confidence in public institutions 
Outcome variables Interpersonal 
trust 
Confidence in 
education 
institutions 
Confidence in the 
media 
Confidence in banks 
and financial 
institutions 
Confidence in the 
government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Panel 1: Predicted slow-tracked students 
Treatment variable  
1. Slow-tracked student successfully got into 
high school (Overachievers)a, 1=yes 
0.18*** 0.26*** 0.10* 0.20** 0.30*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
2. Student individual, parent and family 
characteristics  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3. School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
1.27** 0.45 -0.16 0.51 1.15* 
(0.59) (0.44) (0.35) (0.51) (0.59) 
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.32 
 Panel 2: Predicted fast-tracked students 
Treatment variable      
4. Fast-tracked student failed to get into high 
school (Underachievers)b, 1=yes 
-0.20*** -0.32*** -0.12*** -0.29*** -0.18*** 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
5. Student individual, parent and family 
characteristics  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6. School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.51 0.64 0.64 -0.41 0.97** 
(0.40) (0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.47) 
Observations 788 788 788 788 788 
R-squared 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.30 0.26 
Note: 
c)  Panel 1 we compare the overachievers with predicted slow-tracked students who unexpectedly matriculated into high schools. 
d) Panel 2 we compare the underachievers with predicted fast-tracked students who unexpectedly did not matriculated into high schools 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
 
